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Abstract
In this paper we expose the theoretical
background underlying our current research. This
consists in the development of behaviour-based
knowledge systems, for closing the gaps between
behaviour-based and knowledge-based system s,
and also between the understandings of the
phenomena they model. We expose the
requirem ents and stages for d eve loping
behaviour-based knowledge system s and discuss
their limits.  We believe that these are necessary
conditions for the development of higher order
cognitive capacities, in artificial and natural
cognitive system s.
1. Introduction
In the field of artificial intelligence, knowledge-based
systems (KBS) and behaviour-based systems (BBS) have
modelled and simulated exhibitions of intelligence of
different types, which we could call “cognitive”
intelligence and “adaptive” intelligence, respectively.
Broadly, and independently of their methodologies, BBS
have modelled intelligence exhibited by animals adapting
to their environment, while KBS have modelled “higher”
cognition: reasoning, planning, and problem solving.
Trying to understand how this higher cognition could
evolve from adaptive behaviour, we propose the
development of behaviour-based knowledge systems
(BBKS). They are systems where an artificial creature is
able to abstract and develop through its behaviour
knowledge from its environment, and exploit this
knowledge for having a favourable performance in its
environment. BBKS relate the exhibitions of intelligence
modelled by BBS and KBS, closing the gaps between
them.
In order to develop these ideas, in the next section we
expose abstraction levels (Gershenson, 2002a) in animal
behaviour, which are useful for illustrating our goals. In
Section 3 we present the steps we believe should be
followed in order to develop and exhibit knowledge
parting from adaptive behaviour. In Section 4 we note
limits of BBKS, which are related to the limits of
Epigenetic Robotics and Artificial Intelligence. W e also
briefly describe our current work, which consists in the
implementation of a BBKS.
2. Abstraction Levels in Animal
Behaviour
Abstraction levels (Gershenson, 2002a)  represent
simplicities and regularities in nature. Phenomena are
easier to represent in our m inds when they are simple.
We can have an almost clear concept of them, and then
we can try to understand complex phenomena in terms
of our sim ple representations. W e can recognize
abstraction levels in atoms, molecules, cells, organisms,
societies, ecosystems, planets, planetary systems, galaxies.
An element of an abstraction level has a simple and
regular behaviour, and it is because of this that can be
easily observed and described. At least easier than the
complexities that emerge from the interactions of several
elements.
We can identify abstraction levels in animal behaviour
(Gershenson, 2001, pp. 2-3), taking the definition of
behaviour developed by Maturana and Varela:
“behaviour is a description an observer makes of the
changes in a system with respect to an environment with
which the system interacts” (Maturana and Varela, 1987,
p. 163). Our proposal is not a final categorization, but it
is quite convenient for orienting our work, even when the
borders between levels are fuzzy. The most elemental
type of behaviour is vegetative, which can be seen as
behaviours “by default” (such as breathing, metabolism,
etc.). We can also distinguish reflex behaviours. These
are action-response-based behaviours (such as reactions
to pain). Stepping-up in  complexity, we can identify
reactive behaviours, which depend strongly of an
external stimulus, or a set or sequence of external
stimuli (McFarland, 1981). Examples of these can be
locomotion patterns. These behaviours (and the ones
which follow) require an action selection process,
whereas reflex behaviours are executed whenever the
triggering stimulus is present. Motivated behaviours do
not only depend on external stimuli (or the absence of
a specific stimulus), but also on internal motivations.
For example, “exploration for food” can be performed
when there is the internal motivation “hunger”. The
previous types of behaviour have been m odelled with
behaviour-based systems (BBS) (e.g. Brooks, 1986;
Beer, 1990; Maes, 1990; 1993; Hallam, Halperin and
Hallam, 1994; González, 2000; Gershenson, 2001).
Reasoned  behaviours are the ones which are
determined by manipulations of abstract concepts or
representations. Preparing yourself for a trip would be
an example. You would like to make plans, for which
you would need to have abstract representations, and
very probably a language (Clark, 1998), and to
manipulate these representations. This manipulation
can be considered as the use of a logic . This level has
been modelled with knowledge-based systems (KBS)
(e.g. Newell and Simon, 1972; Lenat and Feigenbaum,
1992). We could speculate about conscious behaviours,
without entering the debate of the definition
consciousness, just saying that they are behaviours that
are determ ined by the individual’s consciousness. W e
do not believe that there is an “ultimate” level of
behaviour. We could, in theory, always find behaviours
produced by mechanisms more and more complex. But
for now we have enough trying to model behaviours
less complex than reasoned ones. If we cannot clearly
identify further levels, there is no sense in trying to
model them. Figure 1 shows a diagram of the types of
behaviours described above.
Figure 1. Abstraction levels in animal behaviour
(Gershenson, 2001).
We believe that the behaviours in the higher levels
evolved and developed from the behaviours in the
lower levels, since in animals you cannot find higher
levels of behaviour without the lower ones. Thus,
higher levels of behaviour require the lower ones, in a
similar way as children need to develop first lower
stages in order to reach higher ones (Piaget, 1968).
Also the higher types of behaviour in many cases can
be seen as complex variants of the lower ones.
Therefore, it is sensible to attempt to build artificial
cognitive systems exhibiting adaptive behaviour of
higher levels incrementally: in a bottom-up fashion
(Gershenson, 2001:3). This does not mean that we
cannot model any level separately. But the more levels
we consider, the less-incomplete our models will be.
Historically, KBS were used first trying to model
and simulate the intelligence found at the level of
reasoned behaviours in a synthetic way (Steels, 1995;
Verschure, 1998; Castelfranchi, 1998). This means that
we build an artificial system in order to test our model,
instead of contrasting our model directly with
observations on the modelled system. The synthetic
method allows us to contrast our theories with artificial
systems, and in the case of intelligence and mind,
theories are very hard to contrast with the natural
systems. KBS have proven to be acceptable models of
the processes of reasoned behaviours. Not only they
help us understand reasoned behaviours, but are able
to simulate these behaviours themselves. But when
people tried to model the lower levels of behaviour, the
artificial systems which were built failed to reproduce
the behaviour observed in natural system s, mainly
animals (Brooks, 1995). This was one of the strong
reasons that motivated the development of BBS on the
first place, but the fact is that BBS have modelled
acceptably animal adaptive behaviour. BBS help us
understand adaptive behaviour (e.g. Webb, 1996;
2001), but also we can build artificial systems which
show this adaptiveness (Maes, 1991).
Figure 2. Simulating exhibitions of intelligence
 (Gershenson, 2001).
But if we believe that reasoned behaviours evolved
and developed from lower levels of behaviour, we
should start thinking how to justify this. Not only to
validate our belief, but for understanding how was this
possible, and to be able to reproduce it. How can
reasoning evolve and develop from adaptive behaviour?
We believe that this can be studied by simulating
reasoned behaviours from a BBS perspective. This
would not be a unification between BBS and KBS, but
a bridge closing the gaps between them. They would be
behaviour-based knowledge systems (BBKS). In other
words, such a system should exhibit knowledge, which
should have been developed, not directly implemented.
In this way, a BBKS would be able to model the
exhibitions of intelligence modelled by BBS and KBS,
also illustrating the relationships between these types
of intelligence: adaptive and cognitive. Also, BBKS are
compatible with the Epigenetic Robotics approach
(Balkenius et. al., 2001; Zlatev, 2001).
We believe that this is a promising line of research.
We argue that this is the most viable path for
understanding most levels of behaviour, and therefore
intelligence: natural and artificial. As the MacGregor-
Lewis stratification of neuroscience notes, “the models
which relate several strata (levels) are most broadly
significant” (MacG regor, 1987, quoted in Cliff, 1991).
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the ideas
expressed above.
But is it possible to simulate knowledge from
adaptive behaviour? We believe it is, and in the
following section we describe how we might attempt to
achieve this.
3. Knowledge from Behaviour
As we stated in the previous section, reasoned
behaviours require abstract representations or
concepts of the perceived world, and an accurate
manipulation of these in order to produce a specific
behaviour. How can these abstract representations and
concepts be acquired? It seems that they are learned
from regularities in the perceptions of objects and
events. We believe that this is how concepts are
created. We define a concept as a generalization of
perception(s) or other concept(s)1. This definition
requires and presupposes embodiment and
situatedness (Clark, 1997). This means that if we
intend to simulate these abstractions, our artificial
creatures should be embodied and situated, or at least
virtually embodied and situated (i.e. in simulations). We
should note that in animals concepts are not physical
structures (if we open a brain we will not find any
concept): they emerge from the interactions of the
nervous system with the rest of the body and
environm ent. We can see them as a metaphor, and
could say that they lie in the eye of the beholder. The
same for other types of representation. And since these
are necessary elements of knowledge, things will be
clearer if we remark that knowledge is not a physical
structure or element either, but an emergent property of
a cognitive system (i.e. an observer needs to perceive
the knowledge).
As an example for showing our use of concepts, a
person begins to develop a concept of “pen” from the
moment she perceives a pen. Then, when she perceives
different instantiations of pens and their uses, all the
regularities will determine her concept of “pen”. We
believe that animals also have such concepts and are
shaped in the same way. A kitten might play with a  ball
of paper to explore what can be done with it. Once the
kitten experiences the possibilities of sensation,
perception and use, a concept representing the ball of
paper should have been created, so that the animal will
behave accordingly in future presentations of balls of
paper. Of course, we have a different concept “ball of
paper” than the kitten, because our perceptions (and
the “hardware” we process them with) are different.
But that a creature has different concepts than the
ones we have, does not mean that it does not have
concepts. The popular “problem” of the frog not
having concept of a fly because frogs confuse other
objects with flies (they try to eat them), is a bizarre
anthropomorphization of the mind (based on the
classical experiments by Lettvin et. al. (1959)). The frog
has a concept, but not of a fly. Their perceptual system
simply does not allow them to distinguish flies and
similar objects. They do not need this to  survive in
their ecological niche. We observe a similar situation
with fiddler crabs. They do not have a concept of
“predator”. They just have a concept of “something
taller than me”, and they run away from it (Layne,
Land, and Zeil, 1997). This is because animals develop
their intelligence to cope with their environment, not
with ours. And even in humans, recent research (e.g.
O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Clark, in press) shows that
our visual perceptions are not as com plete as they
seem to us. W e need to be aware of this while studying,
and judging, animal and human intelligence. Concepts
are necessary because it has a huge computational cost
to remember each particular object and to act
accordingly. Generalizations allow the cognitive system
to produce similar actions in similar situations at a low
computational cost.
But, strictly speaking, all humans also have
different concepts for the same objects, since we have
had different experiences of them. It is only because of
language that we can communicate referring to the
same classes of objects even when the mechanisms
which determ ine in our brains those concepts might be
very different from each other.
1This is not the classical notion of concept in the
philosophy of mind literature (e.g. Peacocke, 1992), and it is
not restricted to humans. It is compatible with the use of
Gärdenfors (2000).
In animals, this ability to abstract concepts from
perceptions should be given by the plasticity of the
animal’s neurons. This implies that some concepts
might be innate, determined by the prenatal wiring of
the neurons, which is dependent on the genome (and
perhaps also proteome). How and why these innate
mechanisms evolve, including the ones allowing the
concept abstraction, are still open questions. One
could argue that it is an advantage to have them, but
recent studies (e.g. Alexander, 2001) have put a
question on wether natural selection is the only (or
even in some cases the main) driving force of natural
evolution. Here we will not discuss this issue, just
assuming that this ability has been already acquired.
We will only say that work in evolutionary robotics (see
Harvey et. al., (1997) and Gomi (1998) for reviews)
might lead to answers for these questions.
So, we can say that an animal is able to abstract
regularities from its environment. W e will not be aware
of them  if the animal does not exploit the acquired
concepts in its behaviour. But if the animal manipulates
the acquired concepts in order to adapt to its
environment, we can say that the animal has abstracted
a logic  of its environment. Knowledge of its environment.
As we stated, this is dependant on the observer, since
we believe that knowledge is an emergent property of
a cognitive system, not an element2. We can also say
that the “proper” use of concepts gives them a certain
meaning, grounded through action.
If we are searching for exp lanations of our logic, the
logic  of our environment, then we should take other
issues into account. First of all, the fact that we live in
a society3, which is shaped by us, and shapes us. W e
have a language, which allows us to  externalize and
share our concepts. This allows us to have an access to
the concepts of others, enlarging our knowledge.
Language and human thought are so interrelated,
interdependent, and internecessary, that some people
even seem to have forgotten that they are different
things4. We believe that language is also necessary for
complex manipulation of concepts (Clark, 1998), and
since an individual can develop a language only in a
society (Steels and Kaplan, 2002), it is only in a society
that an individual can develop higher cognition
(Gershenson, 2001), as it seem s has been in nature
(Dunbar, 1998). Through generations, a culture is
formed, accumulating past experiences.
Summing up, the epigenetic stages we should follow
to reach knowledge from behaviour, should be:
1. concept abstraction.
2. grounding of concepts though action.
3. sharing of concepts through social interactions
(language).
4. manipulation of concepts (logic5).
5. evolution of concepts (culture).
Note that knowledge is not acquired only until
completing all the stages, but it is developed gradually
with every stage. And we will not say that our
knowledge cannot be improved as well, i.e. we can
always add m ore stages. Also, steps 3 and 4 could
exchange places. In fact, there have been models and
theories which address most of the steps described
above, but separately (e.g. Scheier and Lambrinos,
1996; Gärdenfors, 2000; Z latev, 2001; C angelosi and
Parisi, 2001; Prince, 2001; Steels and Kaplan, 2002),
and thus they answer only partially the question of how
knowledge could evolve from adaptive behaviour.  Of
course, it is necessary to have such models and theories
before attempting to model all the path, and they all
can be considered as BBKS or BBKS theories.
These requirements for acquiring higher order
cognition seem quite sensible, and have been proposed
with similar approaches (e.g. Kirsh, 1991; Steels, 1996;
Clark, 1997; Balkenius et. al., 2001; Zlatev 2001;
Gershenson, 2001; Steels and Kaplan, 2002).
Another way of convincing ourselves to follow this
path is to analyze it backwards: if we take from humans
each of the stages described, how do our knowledge
would be diminished? Without culture we would not be
able to accumulate knowledge from generation to
generation, and only by our physiological abilities we
would be at a level even lower than social primates.
Without being able to manipulate concepts we would
not be able to make inferences nor predictions.
Without a language we would not be able to learn what
other individuals have learned, and we would be
restricted to our individual learning. Without concepts,
we would just have reactive behaviours, without the
possibility of integrating our sensory experiences to
produce complex behaviours. But of course, for using
these concepts they need to be grounded.
We believe that following this approach, consistent
with Epigenetic Robotics (Balkenius et. al., 2001;
Zlatev, 2001), we will be able to build systems which
develop their own logic, consistent with their
environment, which w ill be able to do reasonings in the
sense a KBS does. Of course, this will not replace KBS,
since their manageability at a knowledge level is much
higher than it would be in BBKS (as noted in
2We should also be careful with language games,
such as “Does a tree knows when spring came because it
blossoms?”.
3The social factor has been proposed to be also
responsible for the evolution of our “big” brains (Dunbar,
1998).
4Though thought seems to have all the properties
of a language... 5We mean logic as a tool, not logic as a science.
Gärdenfors (2000)). But KBS deliver us no knowledge
of how knowledge takes place, whereas this is the goal
of BBKS.
4. Limits of BBKS
The proposed line of research is no panacea . We
can already see several limitations of this approach,
which should be considered if to follow this path.
When we model natural exhibitions of intelligence
(Figure 2), some people might say that we sin of
oversimplification, because we do not model all the
conditions which affect a natural cognitive system. But
simplification is a necessity, due to the immense
complexity of the phenomena which are modelled. It is
this complexity, and all the information (even when it
might be redundant) that our cells and brains can
contain, that force us to make simplifications in our
models. We believe that this information is so huge
that the com plexity of natural organisms exhibiting
intelligent behaviour cannot be simulated in artificial
systems without simplification6. Our actual computers
are very far from being able to calculate in real time all
the necessary operations which  a realistic (non
oversimplifying) model would require. Some
alternatives might lie in DNA  computing (Benenson et.
al., 2001), but even if we had such computational
power as the one required to imitate convincingly
living organisms, how to program all the necessary
information? At this moment this seem s impossible  in
a short time scale.
But where to go? It seems we can make a
distinction depending on our purposes. If we are
interested in understanding intelligence (as we are with
the development of BBKS), then our limited models
creating artificial systems seem to suit our purposes. If
we want to produce intelligence “higher than human”,
we can learn a bit from the history of such attempts. In
the beginnings of Artificial Intelligence, some people
assumed that all the knowledge of a human adult might
be programm ed. Other people aware of obvious
difficulties, looking at how natural systems acquire
their knowledge, thought of programming a “child”
computer that would be able to learn as a child does
(e.g. Turing, 1950) (of course, “one could not send the
machine to school without the other children making
excessive fun of it” (Turing, 1950)), (it is easier if you
do not program everything but let the parameters be
adjusted by the system, i.e. learned). Another
alternative has been to evolve the mechanisms in
charge of producing intelligent behaviour, also being
inspired in nature (it is easier if you do not program
everything but let the model be adjusted by the system,
i.e. evolved), but it has required too much
computational power in order to aspire to reach
“higher order” intelligence by itself. These alternatives
and combinations of them have been used depending
on the ideas and purposes of researchers, modelling
from bacteria to hum an societies, all of them “sinning
of oversimplification”.  So, if we want to produce
intelligence “higher than human”, it seems sensible
that we should not start building the computational
mechanisms from scratch. This is, we should not
attempt to throw away five billion years of evolution
and the computational power of our cells, and start
from where we already are, even from the hardware
perspective. This implies that we should build our
systems on us (The best model of a cat is another cat,
and if possible, the same cat). But for this of course we
need first to understand with our limited simplified
models how our mind works, in order to try to improve
it.
But we should notice that we already make
intelligence “higher than human”, just with our cultural
and technological evolution. There was already human
intelligence more than two thousand years ago, but we
could say that we are able  to exhibit more intelligence
(we are able to solve more tasks) than humans of even
a hundred years ago (e.g. you can make calculations
much easier with a computer than with pen and paper).
By altering the nature of our environments, changing
them to suit our purposes, we make our environments
and our tools to manipulate them more complex, and
our intelligence can be considered to be higher (Clark,
2003). Or from another perspective, we raise the level
of human intelligence, even with roughly the same
“hardware” (Our DNA has not changed much in the
last ten thousand years). Cultural evolution implies
that the intelligence will be improved each generation.
And the  understanding of this process, will allow us to
guide it.
5. A Behaviour-based Knowledge
System
We are currently developing a  BBKS in order to
study the development of knowledge in artificial
cognitive systems. Following the ideas presented in
Gershenson, González and Negrete (2000), we are
constructing a virtual laboratory in order to contrast
our models as virtual animats develop and survive in
their environment. This virtual laboratory can be
downloaded  ( source  code inc luded)  fro m
http://www.cogs.sussex.ac.uk /users/carlos/keb. A
screenshot of the virtual environment can be
appreciated in Figure 3.
6This idea is clearly presented by Michael Arbib
(1989), speaking about brain models: “a model that simply
duplicates the brain is no more illuminating than the brain
itself” (p. 8).
Figure 3. Screenshot of the virtual environment.
At this stage, animats are able to extract regularities
from their sensors developing data structures which we
call “koncepts”. Then regularities in these koncepts
recursively form koncepts of a higher level. With a
simple reinforcem ent learning schem e, koncepts are
linked to actions, grounding a form of “meaning” of
the koncepts. Using these koncepts for select their
actions, animats are able to survive in their simple
environment.
We are currently developing more com plex tasks, in
order to model how logic can em erge from the use of
abstract koncepts, in a similar way as the one proposed
by Gärdenfors (1994). We are also interested in
studying the sharing of koncepts through a form of
com munication, and how this affects the cognitive
development of the animats. An extensive description
of this work will be found in Gershenson (2002b).
6. Conclusions
We have proposed the development of behaviour-
based knowledge systems for explaining the transition
of from adaptive behaviour to high cognitive processes
in a synthetic fashion. This is, with our artificial systems
we are not only understanding the natural systems
which inspire us, but at the same time we become
capable of engineering systems with the potentialities
of the natural ones. We have stated broadly the steps
and requirem ents that BBKS should follow for
producing knowledge of their environment while still
exhibiting adaptive behaviour. We have also discussed
some limitations of BBKS and presented briefly our
current work.
An additional motivation for developing BBKS is
for doing philosophy of mind and philosophy of
cognitive science with the aid of synthetic systems:
synthetic philosophy. In this way, theories of mind,
concepts, meaning, representation, intentionality,
consciousness, etc. could be contrasted with our
synthetic BBKS, reducing a bit the space for rhetoric.
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